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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH WOOL PULLING COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14659 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case originated when Salt Lake City initiated con-
demnation proceedings against the defendant. A settlement 
was reached on the value of all of the defendant's property, 
including the value of all defendant's land and buildings 
and the piping, pumps, reservoirs and associated water diver-
sion facilities, for removing and using underground water at 
their plant under their water rights. The only issue left 
in the case by stipulation was the value, if any, of the 
defendant's water rights. Plaintiff contended full market 
value had been paid for defendant's properties and that stand-
ing alone, tl1e defendant's water rights had no value. 
D~fendant believed the rights ~ay have separate value and 
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asked time to determine, foolishly granted. Three years 
later defendant asked for trial on the issue. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was heard before the Honorable Gordon R. 
Hall, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County. Despite the fact that the parties had 
agreed to and defendant had been paid for all elements of 
value for the defendant's property, including the value of all 
well pipes, pumps, reservoirs and other facilities for divert-
ing and using water from underground to the defendant's wool 
pulling operation, the Court allowed the defendant to go 
into all of the operations of the wool pullery and to examine 
uses the water was put to and the cost of replacing the water, 
as opposed only to the value of the water rights in their 
location and without diversion facilities which has been paid 
for. The matter went to the jury with instructions from the 
Judge, over objections of plaintiff, that they could consider 
the diversionary uses to which the water was put and the value 
of the water. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant asks that the judgment on the verdict 
be reversed, or set aside. If set aside, that a new trial 
be granted centering only on the value of the water rights in 
locus, and not on water or water right values outside the aqui-
fer basin in which defendant's property was located, or that they 
may have produced through the water diversion facilities already 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
paid for by defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
On May 8, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation 
(R 31-33) upon the market value for all properties to be con-
demned, except for the value, if any, of water rights, as set 
forth in paragraph 7 of the parties' stipulation (R 31-32). 
Judgment was entered (R 29,30) giving possession of the pro-
perty to Salt Lake City Corporation, and for which payment, 
pursuant to said stipulation, was made. Included with the 
amount paid to the defendant was the sum of $12,749.00 (R245), 
the agreed market value of the wells, including all piping, 
pumping connections, and reservoir facilities associated with 
diverting the water from underground for use by the defendant 
in the wool pullery. 
The only issue, not fully resolved, was the value of the 
defendant's water rights. The plaintiff contended that the 
defendant's water rights had no value in view of the fact 
that defendant had been paid market value for all of the 
diversionary facilities. Merely by filing application with 
the State Engineer, a right to drill water in the same area 
for any amount could be obtained. The value then of water 
rights in the area where defendant's property was located was 
only the value of the diversion facilities plus what it cost 
to obtain the right to drill (R 268, 269). Defendant's 
witness Mr. C. Francis Solomon, verified this position in his 
testimony (R 238-272) and also stated that a new well could 
be drilled according to his investigation for a sum of not 
-3-
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to exceed $8,000.00 which would produce the same amount of 
water defendant was producing from five wells (R 267). 
Nearly three years later, some time just prior to 
November 24, 1975, the defendant's attorney apparently called 
the Court asking for a trial setting. The notice of trial 
setting (R 36) setting the matter for a non-jury trial, was 
the result. The defendant had decided to come to Court and 
attempt to obtain a windfall. 
Trial began June 4, l976 and defendant began with his 
first witness in attempting to show the value of the use of 
the water, as opposed to the value of the water right without 
diversion facilities (R 154-156). Defendant's attempts to 
do so were resisted by objection, a typical exchange of which 
is found on line 9 through 19 R 156 and lines 1 through 17 
R 157. The Judge ruled against defendant sustaining plaintiff's 
objection as to relevance (R 163) and defendant made a proffer 
of proof contending that he could not proceed further and 
could not put on a case without being allowed to tie the water 
rights to their specialty use (R 173 lines 27-39). Defendant 
contended that the value of the water rights had to be evaluated 
with the total of the value of the property, which had already 
been paid for. 
Defendant admitted that the water rights had no market 
value after the stipulation and payment by plaintiff (lines 
20-25 R 177), and the plaintiff asked for a directed verdict 
(R 186, 187). The Court reversed itself, in error (R 187, 188), 
and allowed Mr. Fuller, over the plaintiff's objection to 
-4-
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proceed and bring in evidence concerning the specialty use 
of the water and value of the water used in error. The 
plaintiff's motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Sum..-nerhays 
as being irrelevant and improper was denied (R 191, 193). 
Plaintiff objected to the valuation approach of Memory 
Cain, defendant's expert appraiser, which was based on the 
operation of the wool pullery (R 205) and to the value of 
the total business (R 207, 208), and comparables outside the 
aquifer basin in which the defendant's property was located 
(R 209, lines 4-24, R 211-215). He also improperly used the 
inherent valuation approach (R 214, lines 28-30, R 215, line 1). 
The Court acknowledged that the evidence of Mr. Cain came 
in under the plaintiff's continuing objection (R 215). 
The plaintiff moved to strike Memory Cain's entire 
testimony concerning his inherent valuation methoJs and com-
parative sales based upon the fact that his comparables were 
based upon remotely located sales of water and water rights 
as opposed to sale of water or water rights in the basin 
where defendant's property was located (R 233-237). Again 
the Court ruled against plaintiff in error (R 237-238). 
Plaintiff's expert witness, Fran Solomon, stated that 
the defendant's water rights had no value because any purchaser 
could readily obtain equivalent water rights and drill his own 
well for a lesser amount of money than was paid to the defend-
ants for their diversion facilities (R 246-251). He also indi-
cated that there were no comparable sales of water or water 
rights in that area because ~ater was so readily available with 
-5-
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nothing more than drilling and diversion costs. 
An expert engineer, Jay Bingham testified that water 
quality of the same or better than that claimed by the defendant 
could be and was produced under his direction, in the same 
aquifer basin, but even further west and closer to the Salt 
Lake than the location of the defendant's wells (R 308), and 
in an even higher volume and at the same or better quality of 
water (R 308-310). 
Mr. Bingham also found no value in the water rights of 
defendant other than their cost of the filing fee (R 288, 289) 
since they had already been paid for their diversion facilities. 
Mr. Dee Hansen, Utah State Engineer, said there was no 
cost and no value attaching to the water right (R 319), because 
the area was open to drilling (R 320) and any person could 
obtain the same or greater water rights in the same aquifer 
basin than those held by the defendant (R 321) . He further 
stated that there was no charge for the water used under the 
defendant's water rights (R 323) and the State Engineer 
recognized the difference between the sale of water and the 
water right itself. The water right had no value (R 328) 
and the only cost of obtaining such rights would be between 
$200.00 to $500.00 to have an engineer certify they had 
proved up on the water rights (R 332) and the cost of drilling 
the well, which in this case defendant had already paid for. 
The Court erred again in allowing defense ~itness 
Mr. Wederbrand to testify concerning the quality and naturo 
of wells in the area, over obje>ctiort (R 337) v.'ithout 'En·in•J 
-6-
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qualified him as an expert witness on water and water rights. 
The Court at first excluded his testimony (R 198) and later 
allowed it in (R 337) in error and over objections and later 
motion to strike. Plaintiff concedes Mr. Wederbrand was a 
wool pullery expert but not a water or water rights expert, 
which he admitted (R 197, 198). 
The case was given to the jury which returned a verdict 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the 
amount of $50,000.00. 
POINT I 
CERTIFIED WATER RIGHTS ARE SEPARABLE FROM 
THE LAND AND CAN BE AND ARE VALUED AND SOLD 
APART FROM THE LAND. 
It is well settled that a certified water right, whether 
riparian or otherwise, is separable from the land and can be 
separately conveyed, 78 Am. Jur.2d, Waters Section 242. Such 
rights normally pass under a deed of conveyance of land to 
which they are attached unless expressly reserved, 78 Am. Jur. 
2d, Water Section 243. In this case the value of such rights, 
if any was expressly reserved from said sale in said stipula-
tion. Plaintiff contended full value had been paid, and 
offered to allow defendant sell those water rights, separate 
and apart from the land which is a common practice in this 
State as verified by the Utah State Engineer (R 323). There-
fore, in this case the water rights should have been considered 
separate and apart from the other properties and property 
r1 ;hts of defendant, which were previously paid for and not 
at issue in this case. 
-7-
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POINT II 
IN EMINENT DOMAIN, THE SOLE AND PRIMARY 
QUERY IS DIRECTED TOWARD THE FAIR MARKET 
VALUE OF THE CONDEMNED PROPERTY. 
Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22, 
the fair market value is the standard bearer of just compensa-
tion. The Utah Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Company v. 
Arthur, 10 U.2d 306, 352 P.2d 393 (1960), stated that such 
was the test: 
"The standard of what is just compensation in the 
ordinary case is market value of the property 
taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay to 
a willing seller." 
In the case at bar, the only property still at issue 
was the certified water rights of defendant and the only 
determination to be made by the Court was the value, if any, 
of that specific property without confusing it or linking it 
to any value previously appraised, estimated or paid for the 
whole property or the water it could produce without the 
diversion facilities which had already been paid for over 
three years prior. The test was what a willing buyer would 
pay for the water rights alone in that aquifer basin. 
Can you see a willing buyer paying $50,000.00 as the 
jury contends, or $80,000.00 as the defendant contends when 
that well informed buyer knows he can obtain such rights for 
less than $500.00 at most? 
The value of the land, the buildings and water diversion 
facilities and use to which water was put at the wool pullery 
was, at the time of trial, irrelevant. The test was what 
-8-
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would a willins buyer pay for only the water rights. The 
testimony of plaintiff's three witnesses in Court was that 
the water rights themselves had no value for the reason that 
anyone could obtain the right to drill a well and obtain as 
much water as was wanted in that aquifer basin where the 
defendant's property was located. See Statement of Facts. 
Such rights admittedly are not so readily obtainable in other 
areas of the State, and, therefore, valuations of sales in 
other aquifer basins would not and did not have any relevance 
to this sale. It was error for the Court to allow this informa-
tion into evidence, over plaintiff's objections and motions to 
strike. 
POINT III 
IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO ASSIGN 
A PECULIAR OR SPECIALTY VALUE TO PROPERTY 
BEING TAKEN UNDER ENINENT Dm1AIN. 
The well settled law in this area is stated in 29(a) 
Corpus Juris Secondum, Eminent Domain, 136(7), which states 
the rule as follows: 
"The concept of market value judicially applied 
applies to the property condemned (citing cases) 
not to the person of the owner (citing cases), and 
only that value need be considered which is attached 
to the property (citing cases). In determining 
the amount of compensation, or the market value 
of the property taken, generally, no account 
should be given to the values or necessities 
peculiar to the owner (citing 43 cases sustaining 
this rule and l against in federal and state 
jurisdictions), or similarly to values or necessi-
ties peculiar to the condemnee (citing cases), 
nor should account to given to the purposes for 
which the property is taken (citing cases)." 
(Comrnent added) 
The only case above mentioned as being against the 
-9-
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rule was the case of Kimball Laundry Company v. U.S., Neb., 
69 S.Ct. 1434, 338 U.S. 1, 93 L.ed. 1765, 7 A.L.R.2d 1280, 
wherein the Army temporarily condemned the plaintiff's 
laundry for the duration of the war. Concerning the issue 
of peculiar value, the Court allowed compensation for the loss 
or damage to the laundry's trade routes which the owners 
could not service during and because of the temporary con-
demnation. 
In view of the foregoing, the only value defendant should 
be allowed to place on the water rights was the value, if 
any, a willing buyer would pay for them without diversion 
facilities, for which plaintiff had already paid, and in the 
aquifer basin where the rights were located. 
POINT IV 
THE VALUATION OF THE ~\TATER PRODUCED BY 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFIED WATER RIGHTS, THROUGH 
DIVERSION FACILITIES ALREADY PAID FOR, AND 
THE SPECIAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
WAS USING THEM, BASED ON IMPROPER VALUES 
AND VALUES OUTSIDE THE AREA \\THERE THE 
PROPERTY WAS LOCATED WERE NOT PROPER FACTORS 
IN DETERMINING HARKET VALUE AND SHOULD NOT 
P~VE BEEN ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE. 
A condemnation must be based upon the fair market 
value of the property taken, which in this case should have 
been the value only of defendant's certified water rights in 
locus and defendant is not entitled to a profit, which allow-
ing this case to stand would be. 
29 A C.J.S Eminent Domain§ 136(8) states: 
"It is not proper to attempt to arrive at value 
by adding elements of value together, or after 
awarding full compensation for the property taken, 
then to allow additional compensation for those 
things which give it value." 
-10-
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This Court agrees with this position, see State of Utah 
v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 31, 286 P.2d 785, and State of Utah v. 
Tedesco, 4 U.2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028. 
The defendant may argue that such is not proper and cite 
Sigurd City v. State, 142 P.2d 154, and Whitmore v. Utah Fuel, 
42 u. 470, 131 P. 907 as grounds for admission of inherent 
values evidence, but neither case is applicable here. 
In the Sigurd case, the City condemned the irreplaceable 
spring water used for irrigation on the land of several ranchers 
leaving the land worth considerably less than it was before. 
The City did not condemn the land and the Court allowed evi-
dence in concerning the inherent value of the whole. Its 
conclusions are not applicable to this case. In the case 
at bar the defendant was fully compensated for and agreed upon 
the market value of the land, buildings and all water diver-
sion and other facilities located on the property. Only the 
right by which defendant removed the water from underground 
was to be valued. Defendant admitted and stipulated that 
the water rights in question had no value after the taking 
(R 186, 187). If they had no value after how could they have 
any value before the take. The value should be the same 
before and after and defendant should not be allowed to have 
it both ways. 
In the Whitmore case, there was no market established for 
the water of the defendant in a condemnation case, because the 
water was so scarce in the area that no one would sell their 
(The opposite of the case at bar, water so plentiful 
-11-
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no one will buy.) In this case the Court allowed pecuniary 
damages measured by the different uses to which he had applied 
it. This case is also inapplicable to the case at bar. 
In order to justify departing the the usual use of market 
value, the condemnee must show that it is impossible to value 
the property without dispensing with the general rule, see 
State v. American, 82 S.D. 231, 144 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1966). 
In the case at bar, the value the defendant placed upon 
the use of water and the purposes for which the defendant 
was using them is not market value and should not have been 
allowed into evidence by the Court so as to confuse the jury. 
This was done in error. A related case on this point is 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barusha, (August 
1974) 526 P.2d 47, wherein the Utah Court stated as follows: 
"The trial court did not err in its ruling market 
value is not a multiple, for the value in use of 
property for a particular purpose is not market 
value but merely a factor in determining such 
value. It is generally improper to express an 
opinion of value in use in terms of so much money. 
There is a clear distinction between value and 
use and market value; a given piece of land 
(in this case the certified water rights) has 
only one market value and not a certain value 
for one purpose and different market value for 
another purpose." (Emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, the entire basis for the defendant's 
case and his presentation to the jury was the use of the water 
and the cost to reproduce it, but defendant's values were not 
based on the water's value in the aquifer basin where the 
defendant's property was located, which value was zero, but 
rather, it was based on remote valuations in three other areas 
-12-
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of the state. It was error for the Court to allow the intro-
duction of defendant's use valuations and the remote and 
improper comparable sales evidence. 
POINT V 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW 
COMPARABLE SALES FROM HEBER VALLEY, CORRINNE 
AND WEBER COUNTY, ALL OF WHICH WERE OUTSIDE 
THE AQUIFER BASIN IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY WAS LOCATED. 
The test of whether comparable sales should be allowed 
in evidence is set forth in the case of State v. Larkin, 27 
U.2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972), which quoted with approval the 
case of State v. Wood, 22 U.2d 317, 452 P.2d 872. 
"Whether evidence of the value of other property 
should be admitted depends upon whether they are 
sufficiently similar in character, location and 
other factors which would influence value that 
they meet the test of 'reasonable comparability' 
so they can reasonably be regarded as having 
probative value as to the worth of the property 
in question. Because of the responsibility of the 
trial judge as the authority in charge of the trial 
he is allowed considerable latitude as to his 
judgment upon the matter and his ruling should 
not be distrubed unless it appears he was clearly 
in error and that this redownded to the pre-
judice of the complaining party." 
In this case, the Court justified the lower court's 
exclusion of comparable sales in Tremonton and Brigham City, 
although the condemnation action was in Box Elder County 
on grounds that the sales from these two areas was too remote 
as to distance and type of area. This rule should have been 
applied in the case at bar. 
The water sales from Heber City, Corrinne and lveber 
County were too far distant as to type and area (underground 
-13-
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water readily available in the defendant's area was not in 
the others), they were not sufficiently similar in character 
(spring water), location or other factors and offered no 
reasonable comparability to the property sought to be valued 
in this case. Additionally the Court's allowance of a 
determination of value to be placed on the sale of water in 
these remote areas as opposed to the value of an underground 
water right in the defendant's plentiful water basin was 
error and prejudiced plaintiff's case. 
The fact that there were no sales of water or water 
rights in the aquifer basin where the defendant's property 
was located was amply explained by the plaintiff's three 
witnesses, that is that there had been no sales of water. 
Plaintiff's witnesses testified such rights had no value 
because anyone could obtain a right to drill for water in the 
area and remove as much as they deemed expedient, with only 
the cost of drilling, which defendant in this case had been 
paid for, and therefore no one would purchase such water or 
water rights in the area. 
POINT VI 
IT \vAS ERROR FOR TilE COURT TO ALLmv AN 
INSTRUCTION ON SPECIALTY PROPERTY 
The Court, over plaintiff's objection and exception, 
allowed defendant's instruction No. 4 (R 94), the Court's 
No. 15 (R 118) to be given in error. Plaintiff contends this 
was error for the reasons stated in Point II and IV hereof. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
The Court erred in reversing itself and allowing 
defendant to.provide allegations concerning the use and in-
herent valuation of the water to defendants, and also in 
allowing value to be placed on water used as opposed to 
strictly the value of certified water rights without diver-
sion facilities in the area where the property was condemned. 
The Court erred in allowing the defendant to introduce 
evidence concerning inherent values and comparable sales of 
water and water rights in other areas not associated with 
the aquifer basin in which the defendant's property was 
located. The Court erred in refusing to strike the testimony 
of defendant's expert witness concerning the inherent and 
comparable sales values of defendant's water based on such 
information. Therefore, the judgment on the verdict in the 
lower court should either be reversed and this Court find 
that the value of the defendant's water rights were zero, 
the defendant having received full market value, or at the 
most $500.00, or that the verdict be set aside and the 
plaintiff-appellant be granted a new trial. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
RAY L. HONTGONERY 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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